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Abstract 
One of the primary functions of natural kind terms (e.g., tiger, gold) is to 
support inductive inferences. People expect members of such categories to 
share important, unforeseen properties, such as internal organs and genetic 
structure. Moreover, inductions can be made without perceptual support: even 
when an object does not look much like other members of its category, and 
even when a property is unobservable. The present work addresses how expec- 
tations about natural kinds originate. Young children, with their usual reliance 
on perceptual appearances and only rudimentary scientific knowledge, might 
not induce new information within natural kind categories. To test this possibi- 
lity, category membership was pitted against perceptual similarity in an induc- 
tion task. For example, children had to decide whether a shark is more likely 
to breathe as a tropical fish does because both are fish, or as a dolphin does 
because they look alike. By at least age 4, children can use categories to support 
inductive inferences even when category membership conflicts with appear- 
ances. Moreover, these young children have partially separated out properties 
that support induction within a category (e.g., means of breathing) from those 
that are in fact determined by perceptual appearances (such as weight). Since 
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we examined only natural kind categories, we do not know to what extent 
children have differentiated natural kinds from other sorts of categories. Chil- 
dren may start out assuming that categories named by language have the struc- 
ture of natural kinds and with development refine these expectations. 
Whales aren’t fish, fool’s gold isn’t gold, and glass-snakes are actually lizards. 
These anomalies pose a problem for theories of categorization: To any casual 
observer, whales look like fish, fool’s gold looks like gold, and glass-snakes 
seem indistinguishable from snakes. As these cases illustrate, certain catego- 
ries capture more than obvious perceptual features. Fish, gold, and lizards 
are examples of natural kind categories, classes of objects and substances 
found in nature. Analyses of natural kinds (Kripke, 1971, 1972; Mill, 1843; 
Putnam, 1970) point out some interesting properties of their category struc- 
ture. 
Mill (1843) noted that certain “kinds” are distinguished by the remarkable 
richness of their correlated features. These categories pick up dense clusters 
of information that extend far beyond our original characterization. For 
example, giraffes share a particular diet, life expectancy, gestation period, 
DNA structure, and so forth-attributes that are impossible to know by casual 
inspection. These properties are in addition to more obvious ones, such as 
four legs, long neck, spots, horns, and other perceptual characteristics. Many 
characteristics of giraffes are not known to the average person and some have 
yet to be discovered even by expert biologists. Sciences such as biology, 
physiology, and chemistry arose to study natural kinds, in part because there 
is a seemingly inexhaustible set of facts to be discovered and understood 
about these categories. 
Mill’s observations are supported by recent work on natural kind terms 
(Kripke, 1971, 1972; Putnam, 1970; Schwartz, 1977, 1979). As part of more 
extensive analyses, Kripke and Putnam point out that natural kinds cannot 
be characterized by simple perceptual properties. Although features may be 
set forth to identify members of a natural kind category, they often do not 
serve as necessary and sufficient criteria. For example, whales are shaped like 
fish and live and swim in water as fish do, but they are not fish. Conversely, 
whales are mammals even though they are not furry and do not walk on land, 
as other mammals do. Usually, of course, perceptual features reliably identify 
the category of an object. Giraffes, for example, have many perceptual char- 
acteristics in common. Yet attributes common to members of a category are 
often impossible to know by casual inspection, as Mill has demonstrated. 
In summary, there are two points concerning natural kinds we want to 
emphasize. First, natural kinds have rich correlated structures, and second, 
they are not necessarily identified by simple perceptual properties. Both of 
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these points suggest hypotheses about how categories are used to support 
induction. The highly correlated structure of natural kinds suggests that new 
features learned about one category member will often be projected onto 
other category members as well. In this way natural kind categories should 
promote inductive inferences. Moreover, given that perceptual features do 
not always identify category members, there are two ways in which inductions 
could be made without perceptual support. First, even if an object does not 
look much like other members of a given natural kind, people should assume 
that it will share relevant properties with other members of the category. 
Second, these properties, such as internal organs or chemical structure, are 
often unobservable by the average person. 
Clearly, only some sorts of inferences within a kind are justified. Among 
animal categories, for example, we expect members of the same species to 
share methods of reproduction, respiration, and locomotion. Yet we do not 
expect other sorts of properties (such as age) to be common even to members 
of the same species. Thus, at least implicitly, people have embedded natural 
kind categories in scientific or prescientific theories that limit what classes of 
properties are expected to be common to a given natural kind category. 
Furthermore, not all terms name natural kinds. Some words (such as 
“square”) are defined by necessary and sufficient features (such as “equilat- 
eral rectangle”). Others, for example words for simple artifacts such as furni- 
ture or clothing, may not have clear defining criteria, yet differ from natural 
kinds in that we do not expect to discover unlimited new facts about them. 
It is doubtful that we would have a science of chairs or of socks, in which 
new discoveries were made. Yet, we do have sciences devoted to individual 
animal and plant species because there are so many properties, as yet un- 
known, that are common to members of each of these types of categories. 
Little is known about how expectations about natural kinds originate. How 
much exploration of categories or even explicit scientific training is needed 
before children come to expect that categories reflect more than superficial 
perceptual similarities? There is a large developmental literature suggesting 
that young children rely on superficial perceptual properties on Piagetian and 
other cognitive tasks (cf. Flavell, 1963, 1985). Young children have often 
been characterized as “concrete” and as “perceptually bound”, meaning that 
their thinking is captured by the appearances of things. Tversky (1985) has 
found, for example, that a 4-year-old typically groups a fire engine with an 
apple because both are red, rather than grouping a fire engine with a car 
because both are vehicles. In this task and others, children seem unable to 
override what are sometimes misleading perceptual cues. 
Based on such findings, one might expect that young children would rely 
heavily on perceptual characteristics of objects for judgments of category 
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membership. Young children may have no means of appreciating the 
rationale for grouping perceptually dissimilar objects together. Even for 
natural kinds, children might represent category members as sharing just 
superficial properties and only later come to realize that they also have deeper 
properties in common. Thus according to this view, children, with their re- 
liance on perceptual features and their limited scientific knowledge, should 
not rely on categories to support inductive inferences about objects. 
On the other hand, children might early on appreciate the highly correlated 
structure of at least some categories, despite their limited scientific knowl- 
edge. Even with only rudimentary scientific beliefs, children could notice that 
some categories have many observable features in common and then extend 
this belief, expecting natural kinds to be united by many unobservable prop- 
erties as well. An appreciation for natural kinds at this early age would 
probably reflect an unsophisticated, undifferentiated belief in the richness of 
categories. Children would lack the requisite scientific knowledge that could 
limit their inductions to categories and attributes that are appropriate. Chil- 
dren may even fail to differentiate between natural kinds and other cate- 
gories, at an early age. 
In this work, we examined children’s understanding of natural kinds. We 
investigated whether preschool children show an appreciation for the richness 
of category structure. As a first step, we tested children on only the clear 
cases: categories that, for adults, capture rich sets of nonobvious properties. 
Because we did not compare natural kinds and other sorts of categories (but 
see Gelman, 1984), the present work cannot determine whether natural kinds 
have any special status for young children. In other words, we will not be 
able to determine whether children are basing their inferences on the natural 
kind status of categories per se. We can, however, determine to what extent 
children rely on category membership to guide their inferences, when such 
inferences are in fact warranted. 
One piece of evidence that children are not solely dependent on perceptual 
similarity for drawing inferences comes from work by Carey (1985). She 
showed several groups of children between ages 4 and 10 a mechanical mon- 
key, one that could move its arms to bang cymbals together. Children, who 
knew that real monkeys breathe, eat, and have baby monkeys, were asked 
whether the mechanical monkey could breathe, eat, and have babies too. All 
but one group of 4-year-old children denied that the mechanical monkey 
possessed these animate properties. Despite the striking perceptual similarity 
of these two types of objects-mechanical and real monkeys--children did 
not generalize facts about one to the other. These children have differentiated 
living things from nonliving things and therefore refused to impute properties 
that characterize living things to nonliving things. At a very general level, 
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then - at the level of basic ontological distinctions (Keil, 1979) such as living 
versus nonliving - children do not rely solely on perceptual similarity for 
drawing inductive inferences. 
In the present set of studies we questioned children about much more 
specific natural kind categories, from both biological (e.g., squirrel and 
snake) and nonbiological (e.g., gold and salt) domains. To determine whether 
children would induce new information from natural kind categories, rather 
than from perceptual appearances, we pitted category membership against 
perceptual similarity. Children were shown two objects and told a new fact 
about each. They then had to infer which of the facts applied to a third object 
that looked very much like one of the first two objects but was given the 
same category label as the other one. These experiments test whether very 
young children are sensitive to the highly correlated structure of natural kind 
categories and whether they use these categories, in the absence of perceptual 
support, to justify inductive inferences. 
Study 1 
Preliminary study with adults 
One of the main assumptions about natural kind categories that motivates 
our developmental work is that adults will rely on the natural kind member- 
ship of an object more than its superficial perceptual appearance to draw 
inferences about internal structure, behavior, and other theoretically relevant 
properties. We tested this assumption in a preliminary study with 20 Stanford 
undergraduates. 
In this preliminary study, twenty sets of picture cards were prepared with 
three pictures per set. Each triad was constructed so that the third picture 
looked like one of the first two pictures, but was from the same category as 
the other. A sample triad is illustrated in Figure 1. New information was 
given about the first two pictures, then a question was asked about the third 
picture. For example, on one problem adults saw a flamingo and a bat. 
Underneath the flamingo was written: “This bird’s heart has a right aortic 
arch only.” Underneath the bat was written: “This bat’s heart has a left aortic 
arch only.” Then below these two pictures was a picture of a blackbird (which 
looked more like the bat than the flamingo). Underneath the blackbird was 
written: “What does this bird’s heart have ?” After each choice, subjects were 
asked to rate their confidence in their answer on a scale from “1” (very 
unsure) to “7” (very sure). 
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Figure 1. Sample triad used in Studies 1-5. 
As predicted, adults based their inferences on the common natural kind 
membership of the objects, far more often than on their outward appearance. 
Overall, they concluded that the target picture had the same property as the 
other similarly labeled object an average of 86% of the time, which is signi- 
ficantly greater than chance, t (19) = 15.77, p < .OOl. Furthermore, subjects 
were highly confident that their choices were correct (mean rating was 5.8 
on the 7 point scale, which is significantly greater than chance, t (19) = 11.65, 
p < .OOl). 
Similarity ratings 
It was important that the pictures that we thought were similar were in 
fact perceived as similar. Therefore we gathered ratings of perceptual similar- 
ity from adult subjects. Eighteen undergraduates participated to fulfill a 
course requirement for an introductory psychology class. 
The 20 sets of pictures were divided into two pairs per set: The target 
picture paired with the picture that received the same category label and the 
target picture paired with the picture that was designed to be more similar in 
appearance. Subjects were given a set of written instructions, telling them 
that each pair should be rated on “how much alike the two pictures look to 
one another, on a scale of ‘1’ (not at all similar) to ‘7’ (extremely similar).” 
Subjects were told that they could take into account shape, color, size, com- 
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plexity, and individual features or parts. However, they were encouraged to 
make an intuitive judgment of overall similarity, rather than spending a great 
deal of time figuring out their answer. Examples of an “extremely similar” 
pair (two gray triangles) and a “not at all similar” pair (a small white square 
and a large black blob) were included. 
Subjects’ ratings of the pictures validated the experimental design of pitting 
perceptual similarity against category membership. Overall, the pictures that 
were designed to be more similar perceptually (e.g., blackbird and bat, or 
shark and dolphin) were rated as much more similar than the pictures that 
were from the same category (e.g., blackbird and flamingo, or tropical fish 
and shark). The similar pictures received a mean rating of 5.49, compared to 
a mean of 2.46 for the less similar pictures, min-F’ (1,29) = 115.8,~ < .OOl. 
Study with children 
Young children might, like the adults, infer a new property of an object from 
its category, or they might instead be governed by the perceptual appearances 
of the objects. In this study, children were tested on the same categories that 
adults were questioned about. However, because they would not understand 




Subjects included 59 children from three preschools in northern California, 
with 19 children in the experimental condition, and 20 children in each of the 
other two conditions. Subjects ranged in age from 4;0 to 4;11, with a mean 
age of 4;5. 
Design 
There were three conditions in this study. In the Experimental condition 
children were taught information about each of two objects. They were then 
shown a third object that looked like one of the two training objects but was 
given the same category label as the other. Children were asked to infer 
which information applied to the third object. This condition was designed 
to reveal whether children’s inferences are influenced by their knowledge of 
an object’s category or by the perceptual similarity. 
A second condition, the No-Conflict Control, was designed to demonstrate 
that when perceptual similarity and category membership coincide, children 
readily draw the correct inferences. In this condition, like the first, children 
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were taught properties of two objects. But in this case, the third object not 
only looked like one of the training objects but was also given the same label 
as that object. 
A final condition, the Attributes control, was designed to make certain 
that children did not already know the information we would be teaching 
them. Children saw only one picture at a time-the third item in the other two 
conditions-and were asked which of the two properties applied. Children 
were expected to perform at about chance level in this condition. 
Procedure 
Each child was tested individually, by one of two experimenters. To main- 
tain children’s interest throughout the 25 minutes that this task required, 
children were given a sticker after each set of pictures to place on a sheet 
that had blank balloons drawn on it. 
Experimental condition. Children saw 20 sets of three pictures each. In- 
formation was given concerning two of the pictures in each set, and children 
were asked a question about the third picture. The third picture looked like 
one of the first two pictures but was given the same category label as the 
other. For example, children were shown a tropical fish, a dolphin, and a 
shark. In this case, the shark was perceptually similar to the dolphin but was 
Table 1. Sample items and attributes used in Studies 1 and la” 
Biological items 
This squirrel eats bugs. (gray squirrel) 
This rabbit eats grass. (brown rabbit) 
(Target:) squirrel (kaibab, looks like rabbit) 
This dinosaur has cold blood. (brontosauros) 
This rhinoceros has warm blood. (gray rhinoceros) 
(Target:) dinosaur (triceratops, looks like rhinoceros) 
Nonbiological ifems 
If you put this gold in a hot oven, it melts. (gold bar) 
If you put this clay in a hot oven, it burns. (reddish blob) 
(Target:) gold (brown blob; looks like clay) 
This pearl comes from inside a sea animal. (seed pearl) 
This marble comes from a big piece of rock. (round, pink) 
(Target:) pearl (round, pink; looks like marble) 
“Descriptions of the objects used are given in parentheses. These descriptions were nor men- 
tioned to subjects. 
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given the same label as the tropical fish. The experimenter labeled the three 
pictures, “fish” for the tropical fish, “dolphin” for the dolphin, and “fish” for 
the shark. Children were asked to repeat the names until they could name 
all three pictures correctly. (On 88% of the trials, children repeated all three 
names correctly on their first try.) The experimenter then pointed to the 
tropical fish and said, “This fish stays underwater to breathe.” She pointed 
to the dolphin and said, “This dolphin pops above the water to breathe.” She 
then pointed to the shark and said, “See this fish? Does it breathe under- 
water, like this fish, or does it pop above the water to breathe, like this 
dolphin?” Further example items are presented in Table 1. 
No Conflict Control. The picture triads and procedure used in this condi- 
tion were identical to that of the Experimental condition, except that the 
labels of the two similar objects were made to agree rather than conflict. To 
continue with the earlier example, in the No Conflict condition children heard 
the tropical fish labeled “fish,” the dolphin labeled “dolphin,” and the third 
picture (shark) labeled “dolphin” (instead of “fish” as in the previous condi- 
tion). The children in this condition were provided with the same information 
about the two initial pictures, i.e., that the fish breathes underwater and the 
dolphin pops above the water to breathe. The experimenter then pointed to 
the third picture and said, “See this dolphin? Does it breathe underwater, 
like this fish, or does it pop above the water to breathe like this dolphin?” 
Children in this condition received only 18 questions because 2 of the 20 
experimental items could not be plausibly relabeled. 
Attributes Control. Children in this condition viewed only one picture at 
a time-the third item from each of the triads in the Experimental condition. 
Without hearing any prior information, children were asked to judge which 
of the two properties applied. For example, children would be shown the 
picture of the shark and asked, “See this fish? Does this fish breathe under- 
water or does it pop above the water to breathe?” 
The items were presented in a different random order to each child, with 
the constraint that all items of a given type (biological or nonbiological) were 
given in a block, with order of the blocks counterbalanced across subjects. 
For each triad, the order in which the two training pictures were shown and 
attributes given was counterbalanced across subjects and across items. Sub- 
jects were randomly assigned to the different conditions, with the constraint 
that these conditions were balanced for age and sex. 
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Results and discussion 
The main question that this study was designed to address is whether pre- 
school children are willing to infer properties of an object based on its natural 
kind category. In particular, when category membership and perceptual simi- 
larity are in conflict, will children show any sensitivity to the category mem- 
bership or will their inferences be based on the appearance of the objects? 
Table 2 presents the data according to condition and item type. 
Table 2. Percent correct (category choices) in Study 1 
Experimental No Conflict Attributes 
condition Control Control 
Biological 67 89 59 
Nonbiological 69 87 48 
Analysis of choices 
To address these questions, we first needed to establish that children’s 
inferences in the Experimental condition were based on the information pro- 
vided to them in the experiment rather than on preexisting knowledge. The 
results of the Attributes Control condition indicate that children were in fact 
unaware of the correct answers. When simply given the test question with no 
extra information to guide their answer, children were performing at chance 
level, answering a mean of 53% of the questions correctly. 
On the other hand, when the perceptual similarity and category label coin- 
cided, in the No Conflict Control, children were quite capable of drawing the 
correct inference. When both the label and the appearance of the object led 
to the same conclusion, children were correct on 88% of the items, which is 
significantly better than chance, t (19) = 10.77, p < .OOl. 
In the Experimental condition, where perceptual similarity and category 
membership were opposed, children preferred to use the category informa- 
tion 68% of the time, which is significantly better than chance, t (18) = 3.78, 
p < .OOl. Thirty-seven percent of the children consistently based their judg- 
ments on common category membership. That is, they inferred the property 
of the new object based on category membership on at least 15 out of 20 
items 0, < .05 by a sign test). In contrast, no child showed a consistent 
preference for basing their inferences on the perceptual similarity of the 
objects. 
A 4-way ANOVA was performed, with condition (experimental, no-con- 
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flict, attributes control), sex, and order of presentation (biological versus 
nonbiological items first) as between-subject variables, and category type 
(biological versus nonbiological) as a within-subject variable. There were 
three significant effects. 
First, there was a main effect of condition, F (2,47) = 21.62, p < .OOl. 
Each condition differed significantly from the other two, by separate t-tests 
0, < .Ol). Thus, the children in the Experimental condition were taking 
account of the training information in deciding about the properties of the 
new objects, as performance in that condition was better than in the Attri- 
butes Control condition. Despite children’s high performance in the Experi- 
mental condition, they were still somewhat misled by perceptual appearances 
as shown by the 20% decrement from the No Conflict Control condition. 
Importantly, however, adults showed a similar pattern, drawing inferences 
based on appearance 14% of the time when category and appearances con- 
flicted (see Preliminary Study with Adults). Thus, 4-year-olds showed a re- 
markably adult-like pattern. 
A min-8” analysis, that treats both items and subjects as random effects, 
was used with the Experimental group and Attributes Control group. Sex and 
category type were included as fixed effects. The No Conflict group was 
excluded because it had 18 rather than 20 items. The difference between 
these two conditions was significant, min-F’ (1,53) = 5.46, p < .05, indicating 
that the effect would generalize to new categories as well as subjects. Children 
were able to use category membership as often for the biological as for the 
nonbiological categories. Overall the mean correct was 67% for the biological 
and 69% for the nonbiological categories. 
The second significant effect was a Category Type X Condition X Sex 
interaction, F (2,47) = 4.38, p < .02, which was marginally significant when 
tested by a min-F’ statistic that included the Experimental and Attributes 
Control condition, min-F’ (1,45) = 3.12, p < .lO. This interaction was due 
primarily to a sex difference in the Experimental condition. Boys were above 
chance on the biological categories (73%), t (11) = 4.69, p < .OOl, but not 
on the nonbiological categories (66%), while girls showed the reverse pattern, 
answering above chance on the nonbiological categories (74%), t (6) = 2.71, 
p < .05, but not on the biological categories (57%). We have no explanation 
for this difference, although it is possible that boys and girls differ as to which 
categories they find more familiar. Boys may be more familiar with snakes, 
worms, bugs, leaves, etc.-that is, the biological categories we tested, 
whereas girls may be more familiar with sugar, salt, diamonds, pearls, etc.- 
the nonbiological categories we tested. 
Finally, there was a Category Type x Presentation Order x Sex interac- 
tion, F (1,47) = 7.07, p < .Ol. Because this effect held for data collapsed 
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across conditions, it is difficult to interpret meaningfully. However, it seems 
largely carried by the Experimental condition, where the sex difference was 
most striking in the first block of items. Performance in the second block did 
not yield any differences between biological and nonbiological categories for 
either boys or girls. 
Similarity ratings 
To determine to what extent similarity accounted for children’s perfor- 
mance, correlations were computed between children’s accuracy in the Ex- 
perimental condition and the similarity ratings of the adults. Both similarity 
ratings and percent of category choices across categories were converted to 
rank-order scores before correlations were computed. Table 3 presents the 
correlations between accuracy in selecting category members and (a) the 
similarity ratings of the category members, (b) the similarity ratings of the 
perceptually similar pairs, and (c) the difference score of (a) minus (b). In 
this study, none of the similarity ratings reliably predict how often children 
based their inferences on membership in a common category. 
Table 3. Correlations between children’s inferences (Studies 1, la, and 3) and adult 
similarity ratings (Spearman’s rho) 
Similarity ratings 



















“p < .05. 
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Study la 
Study la was a modified replication of the Experimental condition of Study 
1. Informal observation in the first study suggested that the children may 
have worried about finding the correct answer. For this reason the instruc- 
tions were modified to explicitly point out that there were two good answers 
and the child needed to pick the best one. 
Eighteen 4-year-olds (mean age of 4;5) participated in the study, none of 
whom had participated in Study 1. The results of Study la replicated those 
of Study 1. Children believe that a category label is a better clue to an 
object’s behavior and internal structure than is outward appearance. Overall, 
children drew inferences based on category membership an average of 73% 
of the time, which is better than chance, t (17) = 5.23, p < .OOl. Despite the 
compelling perceptual similarity of two of the objects in each triad, no child 
chose consistently (i.e., above chance) on the basis of appearance. In con- 
trast, 50% of the children consistently chose on the basis of common category 
membership. 
In summary, for many 4-year-olds, natural kind categories such as squirrel 
and diamond promote a rich set of inductive inferences. These young children 
have already come to expect new knowledge to be organized in accord with 
the categories named by their language even in the stringent test case where 
the label conflicts with outward appearances. These results are quite surpris- 
ing in two respects: first, children typically rely on perceptual similarity on 
cognitive tasks. And second, research by Carey demonstrates that children 
lack the scientific knowledge that could justify their categorical choices here. 
We will return to this issue in Study 3. 
Study 2 
In Study 1, children relied more on category membership than perceptual 
similarity to draw inductive inferences. Identity of categories was always con- 
veyed by identity of the category labels. One question this raises is whether 
identity of the linguistic information is necessary for children to use the com- 
mon category as a basis for inductive inferences, or whether other means of 
indicating common category membership would be sufficient. To address this 
question, we ran a Synonyms condition where category membership was 
conveyed by means of synonyms rather than identical labels. If children infer 
that objects named by synonyms (e.g., “rabbit” and “bunny”) share the same 
properties, then their within-category inferences cannot be based simply on 
identity of the labels. Unfortunately, however, there are not many synonyms 
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for natural kinds in the vocabulary of 4-year-olds. So to supplement the few 
synonyms we could find, we also included categories that were related by 
subset-superset relations, e.g., “rose-flower.” These pairs in addition to hav- 
ing different labels, would also require children to make an additional infer- 
ence (e.g., that a rose is a flower) to use the common category as a basis for 
drawing an inductive inference. Therefore, they should underestimate the 
categorical inferences children would make if genuine synonyms could be 
found. 
Another question that Study 2 was designed to address is whether children 
would use the common category to make even arbitrary decisions for which 
common category membership is not relevant. To test this we ran an Arbi- 
trary Decision condition where children were asked to decide what color 
marker should go on a picture after witnessing the experimenter place one 
colored marker on a perceptually similar picture and a different colored 
marker on a dissimilar picture with the same category label. If children are 
distinguishing between the induction task where category labels are relevant 
and this arbitrary task, where they are not, then children should be at chance 
in this condition, having no real basis on which to make a decision. 
Both conditions just described provide strict tests of children’s reliance on 
categories. Children may fail to use the appropriate information in each con- 
dition, even if they possess an adult-like understanding of category structure. 
In the Synonyms condition, children must make additional inferences (e.g., 
a rose is a flower; a bunny and a rabbit are the same sort of thing) in order 
to rely on the category. In the Arbitrary Decision condition, children have 
no rational basis on which to make a decision, and so may rely on the category 




Subjects included 48 preschoolers, none of whom had participated in 
Studies 1 and la, from six nursery schools in northern California. Children 
were tested in three conditions: the Synonyms condition, the Arbitrary Deci- 
sion condition, and the Standard condition. The age range and mean age for 
each condition were: Synonyms condition (4;3 to 5;8, 4;lO); Standard condi- 
tion (4;0 to 5;6,4;9); Arbitrary Decision condition (4;0 to 5;6,4;9). Nineteen 
of the children were girls. 
Procedure 
The task was introduced to all children as a game, in which after every set 
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Table 4. Sample items and attributes used in Study 2a, b 
This puppy [baby dog] hides bones in the ground. (brown dachshund) 
This fox hides food in the ground. (red fox) 
(Target:) puppy (red dog, looks like the fox) 
This snake [cobra] eats plants. (cobra) 
This worm eats meat. (earthworm) 
(Target:) snake (small brown snake, looks like worm) 
When you put this sand [the desert] in water, it just gets wet. (hard lump of reddish sand) 
When you put this sugar in water, it melts. (pile of brown sugar) 
(Target:) sand (pile of brown sand, looks like the sugar) 
This rock [stone] comes from a mountain. (rounded blob) 
This chalk comes from the ocean. (angular, flat-surfaced) 
(Target:) rock (angular, flat-surfaced; looks like the chalk) 
aAlternative labels are given in square brackets. 
bDescriptions of the objects used are given in parentheses. These descriptions were not men- 
tioned to subjects. 
of pictures the child would receive a sticker to place on a sheet of paper to 
make a picture. Before presenting the experimental items, the researcher 
first asked the child three easy warm-up questions (e.g., “Is this [green bow] 
green or is it red?“). 
Children in the Synonyms condition received eight problems, each consist- 
ing of a triplet of pictures constructed to be analogous to those in the earlier 
studies. Unlike the earlier studies, however, category membership was con- 
veyed by means of synonyms. For example, one triplet consisted of a target 
rabbit, another rabbit with different appearance, and a squirrel that had long 
ears and looked like the target rabbit. The two rabbits in the Synonyms con- 
dition were called “rabbit” and “bunny,” respectively. Examples of items and 
attributes can be found in Table 4. 
Children in the Standard condition received the same eight sets of items 
as in the Synonyms condition, except that objects from the same category 
were given identical labels rather than synonyms. This task is a replication of 
Studies 1 and 2, except for the items used. So for example, on one item 
children saw two rabbits and a squirrel - and both rabbits were labeled 
“rabbit. ” 
Children in the Arbitrary Decision condition saw the same eight sets of 
items and heard the same labels for the pictures as in the Standard condition. 
However, the experimenter presented the child with an arbitrary, game-like 
task rather than with a series of inferencing problems. That is, for each 
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problem the experimenter placed a small card with a colored dot on each of 
the first two pictures. For example, the experimenter placed a red dot on one 
rabbit and a yellow dot on the squirrel. The child then had to pick which 
color dot to put on the third picture (the other rabbit that looked like the 
squirrel): a yellow dot or a red dot. 
Results and discussion 
In the Standard condition, designed to replicate Study 1, children once again 
drew inferences to category members above-chance (68% of the time, t (15) 
= 2.83, p < .OS). Moreover, as the results from the Synonyms condition 
indicate, children do not need to hear common labels to use common category 
membership to draw inferences. In the Synonyms condition, where children 
heard either synonyms or subclass-superclass relations to indicate common 
category membership, children still were basing their inferences on category 
membership greater than chance (63% of the time, t (15) = 3.87, p < .005). 
The results of this study further indicate that children have begun to dif- 
ferentiate between inferences where category membership is relevant from 
arbitrary decisions where it is not. When children were asked about arbitrary 
decisions, e.g., what color chip should go on a given picture, they were not 
significantly more likely to base that decision on the color chip they had seen 
placed on a common category member than a chip placed on a perceptually 
similar picture. Children in the Arbitrary Decision condition were performing 
at chance levels (57% category choices, t (15) = 1.45, p > .l). 
The results in the last two conditions were very close (63% versus 57%). 
It appears that children may have a slight bias toward basing their answers 
on category membership, even in the Arbitrary Decision task. Nonetheless, 
responses in the two conditions look clearly different when the patterns of 
individual children are considered: only 6% of the children in the Synonyms 
condition answered based on appearance more than half of the time, whereas 
25% of the children in the Arbitrary Decision condition did so. 
In summary, children’s inferences were based on the category membership 
of the objects in question, and not simply on how the pictures were labeled. 
First, children drew inferences within each category even when category 
members were not given identical labels. And second, when category mem- 
bers WeYe given identical labels, children relied on these category names 
above chance only when the task required them to draw inferences. 
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Study 3 
The purpose of Study 3 is to examine whether preschool children are selective 
in the kinds of inferences that they make. Children this young have im- 
poverished scientific knowledge (Carey, 1985; Dickinson, 1982), yet firmly 
believe that category members have more in common than meets the eye. 
This implies that preschoolers’ beliefs about categories may be a fairly general 
one, unchecked by specific world knowledge. In other words, preschoolers 
may not have sorted out which properties legitimately do and do not promote 
inferences within natural kind categories. Instead, they might erroneously 
infer information on the basis of common category membership, even when 
asked about attributes that are more likely to be consequences of physical or 
perceptual properties. 
The properties that were examined in the previous studies are ones that in 
fact should be largely determined by the natural kind category of the objects. 
There are cases, however, where inductive inferences based on category 
membership would be unwarranted. Whether a substance is solid or granular, 
for example, is a good predictor of whether it will blow away in the wind; its 
category membership is less predictive. Note that even in this simple example, 
the perceptual information alone is not sufficient to draw the conclusion. 
Some, at least primitive, knowledge of the relation between granularity and 
stability is needed. The answer is not given perceptually but must be derived 
from the perceptual information. If attention to category membership domi- 
nates children’s judgments regardless of type of property, then children 
should assert, for example, that a rock-like chunk of salt will blow away in 
the wind as does fine-grained salt, and not remain in place as does a rock. 
Method 
Subjects 
Forty children, 20 girls and 20 boys, from nursery schools in northern 
California participated in this study. The children ranged in age from 4;0 to 
5;0, with a mean age of 4;6. None of these children had participated in the 
earlier studies. 
Procedure 
Children were randomly assigned to either the Experimental or the Control 
condition with the restriction that the two conditions were balanced for age 
and sex. Children in the Control condition were given the 20 test questions 
without any extra information. For example, children were shown the shark 
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Table 5. Sample items and attributes used in Study 3” 
--~-- 
Biological items 
This bird’s legs get cold at night. (flamingo) 
This bat’s legs stay warm at night. (black bat) 
(Target:) bird (blackbird, looks like a bat) 
This snake cats a cupful of food. (cobra) 
This worm eats a spoonful of food. (earthworm) 
(Target:) snake (brown snake, looks like worm) 
Nonbiological ifcms 
If you squeeze this diamond, nothing happens. (round, uncut diamond) 
If you squeeze this glass, it’ll cut your hand. (cut glass) 
(Target:) diamond (cut; looks like the glass) 
This cotton is a soft place for a spider to sleep. (cotton ball) 
This silk is too hard for a spider to sleep on. (swatch of cloth) 
(Target:) cotton (swatch of cloth, looks like silk) 
“Descriptions of the objects used are given in parentheses. These descriptions were nor men- 
tioned to subjects. 
and heard, “This is a fish. Do you think it weighs 20 pounds or 100 pounds?” 
The procedure for the Experimental condition was identical to that of 
Studies 1 and 2, except that different attributes were being taught. Children 
viewed three objects, two placed side-by-side and one centered beneath 
them. Each of the objects was labeled and children were asked to repeat the 
labels. A property was attributed to each of the two topmost pictures, and 
then children asked which of the properties applied to the third target picture. 
Examples of the items selected are presented in Table 5. For example, after 
the pictures were labeled, children were told of a tropical fish: “This fish 
weighs 20 pounds.” They were told about an object from a different category, 
in this case a dolphin, that, “This dolphin weighs 100 pounds.” They were 
then asked about the target picture, a shark that looked more like the dolphin 
than the tropical fish: “See this fish? Does it weigh 20 pounds like this fish 
or 100 pounds like this dolphin ?” Children were asked to justify their choice 
after each item. 
Results and discussion 
In this study children were asked questions about perceptually based attri- 
butes: weight, visibility at night, and so forth. With no prior information on 
Categories and induction 201 
Table 6. Patterns of responses of subjects in Studies 1, la, 2, and 3 
Number of categorical choices 





00 16 47 37 
00 17 33 50 
20 35 25 20 
Number of categorical choices 





06 19 44 31 
00 31 63 06 
“below chance, p <: .05. 
babove chance, p C: .05. 
which to make inferences, children in the Control condition selected the 
category choice no more than expected by chance (48% of the time). In 
contrast to the earlier three studies, fewer children in the Experimental con- 
dition based their inferences on common category membership. They selected 
on the basis of common category an average of 49% of the time which is not 
significantly different from chance or from the control group. Yet the Experi- 
mental condition, unlike the Control, was markedly trimodal. Four of the 20 
children consistently selected on the basis of perceptual similarity, that is, 
they chose the attribute of the perceptually similar picture for at least 15 out 
of 20 items, and four children consistently selected on the basis of common 
category membership even though that choice was unwarranted. The remain- 
ing 12 children did not seem to know which answer to choose, with a mean 
of 47% categorical choices. This condition contrasts with the Control condi- 
tion, in which all 20 children fell into the “undecided” group. (See Table 6 
for the results.) 
From these data, it is clear that at least some children are sensitive to the 
type of attribute involved when drawing inferences. Children in this study 
relied less on the category than in Studies 1, la, and 2. Overall, children were 
sensitive to the differences between attributes such as weight, that are conse- 
quences of perceptual properties, and attributes such as means of breathing, 
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that are common to members of a species. Twenty percent of children in this 
study consistently based their judgments on perceptual similarity, whereas 
only 1% did so in the earlier three studies of attributes common to a natural 
kind category. 
On the other hand, some children based their inferences predominantly 
on common category membership, thereby overgeneralizing the importance 
of the category label. It was unwarranted for children to assume, for example, 
that a legless lizard can run as quickly as a four-legged lizard, or that a large 
pearl weighs as much as a smaller pearl. These children understood the im- 
portance of category names to promote induction, but were not selective in 
their inferences. In part this result may be explained by a closer consideration 
of the attributes used in this study. Each was related only indirectly to a 
perceptually obvious feature. For example, one item asked how well a short- 
eared rabbit can hear. Unless a child realizes the link between ear-size and 
hearing ability, he or she will miss the relevance of appearance for this attri- 
bute. It could be that children are most sensitive to the distinction between 
“deep” and “shallow” attributes, when the perceptual basis of the attributes 
is especially clear. 
We found some support for this hypothesis in a small supplementary study 
with adults. Eight graduate students (naive to the purpose of the study) were 
asked to rate how much each of the properties in Study 3 “depends on some 
visually perceptible property (such as size, color, or shape),” using a scale of 
1 (“appearances are NOT relevant”) to 7 (“appearances are VERY rele- 
vant”). We then correlated the ranks of these ratings, on an item-by-item 
basis, with the ranks of children’s category choices in Study 3. We would 
expect the correlations to be negative, if children’s responses reflect how 
“perceptual” each property seems to adults. The correlations were .13 and 
-.70, for biological and nonbiological categories, respectively. At least for 
the nonbiological categories, children are significantly more likely to draw 
inferences based on appearance when the property clearly calls for an appear- 
ance-based answer (p < .05). 
Similarity ratings 
Table 3 presents the Spearman’s rho correlations between children’s infer- 
ences in this study and adult similarity ratings, on an item-by-item basis. For 
biological categories, perceptual similarity of the pictures significantly corre- 
lates (on one of three measures) with children’s performance on the inferen- 
cing task. That is, the perceptual pull of the similar picture predicts the 
proportion of choices based on appearance. 
In sum, two factors affect children’s performance in this study: (1) for 
biological categories, the perceptual pull of the similar picture; (2) for non- 
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biological categories, the perceptual relevance of the property. Thus, children 
are at least somewhat selective as to when they draw inductive inferences 
based on category membership. 
Yet some children draw many more inferences based on category member- 
ship than others, on this task. The distribution of results in Study 3 is clearly 
non-random (fully 40% of the children performed significantly above or 
below chance). This age may be a transitional period: children may start out 
overgeneralizing the importance of the category label, then gradually refine 
their expectations, drawing inferences only for relevant properties such as 
internal structure (not weight or visibility). 
General discussion 
On each of a series of problems, children had to decide whether a given 
object possessed one or the other of two attributes. On hearing the bare 
question alone, with no prior information to guide them, children had no 
basis for forming an induction and, as expected, simply guessed at which 
property applied. In two other conditions, children were first told which 
attribute applied to each of two training objects. In the simple case where 
one of the training objects matched the target object in both appearance and 
category, 4-year-old children almost always drew the appropriate inference. 
For example, children would infer that a second dolphin (large and gray) 
pops out of the water to breathe, after finding out that a first dolphin (large 
and gray) pops out of the water to breathe. Their performance in the No 
Conflict condition was excellent, and establishes that the simple inferential 
problem is well within the capacity of young children. 
The most informative condition was one in which perceptual appearance 
and the category of an object led to divergent conclusions. Children were 
taught a property of one object and a different property of a second one. 
They were then shown a third object that looked much like one of the first 
two but was given the same category label as the other. For example, children 
saw a tropical fish and were told that it was a fish and that it breathes under- 
water. They saw a dolphin and were told it was a dolphin and that it pops 
out of the water to breathe. They then had to decide how a second fish, a 
shark that looks like a dolphin, breathes. Children relied on the shared cate- 
gory to promote inductions even in this stringent case where perceptual simi- 
larity would lead to a different conclusion. Moreover, children’s inferences 
are based on common category membership and not just on identity of labels. 
In Study 2, when members of the same category were given synonymous 
labels (e.g., “rock” and “stone”) or subclass-superclass labels (e.g., “rose” 
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and “flower”), children still preferred to draw inferences within the category, 
above chance. 
These results are at odds with a widely held view that children’s thinking 
is strongly influenced by the perceptual appearances of things. Several of our 
findings suggest that children are not dominated by appearances either in 
their conception of the structure of categories or in their use of categories to 
support inductions. First, most children accepted our label for the third object 
even though it looked more like a member of the other category. For exam- 
ple, one object was a squirrel with very long, rabbit-like ears. Overall, it 
looked more like a typical rabbit than a squirrel. Some children noted the 
discrepancy, some even mildly objected to the label, but for the most part, 
children accepted the labels for these abnormal category members. This find- 
ing is consistent with recent work by Flavell, Flavell, and Green (1983) on 
the development of the appearance-reality distinction. Like our subjects, 
preschool children in their studies accepted category labels even in the face 
of discrepant appearances (e.g., a sponge that looks convincingly like a rock 
is called a “sponge” by these children). 
Second, only one out of 69 children in the Experimental condition, in 
Studies 1, la, and 2, consistently generalized properties on the basis of per- 
ceptual similarity between objects. Even though the rabbit and the rabbit- 
eared squirrel looked very much alike, children did not assume that they both 
ate grass like the rabbit did. Rather, children reliably used the category of 
the object to support inductive inferences, even when this conflicted with the 
appearance of the objects. 
The only kinds of properties asked about, in Studies 1 and la, were ones 
that were reasonable to project from one category member to another. We 
asked about the eating habits, means of breathing, and internal organs of 
biological categories, and about chemical and physical properties of non- 
biological categories. The results of Studies 2 and 3 indicate ways in which 
children have begun to limit the importance of the category. First, when the 
task involves only some arbitrary decision to be made, children are not biased 
to base the decision on category membership. Second, children have begun 
to limit induction proper. In Study 3, we asked children about properties that 
should generalize on the basis of perceptual properties rather than category 
membership. For example, children were shown a rock and told that it would 
not blow away in the wind, and some fine-grained salt and told that it would 
blow away in the wind. They were then shown a rock-like chunk of salt and 
asked whether this salt would or would not blow away in the wind. In answer- 
ing such questions, a few children did consistently rely on category member- 
ship. These children have overgeneralized the relevance of the category for 
induction. Most children, however, did not reliably use the category to sup- 
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port the inductions. For example, they did not consistently infer that the 
rock-like chunk of salt would blow away in the wind as would the fine-grained 
salt. Across several studies, those children who were asked about percep- 
tually based properties were the only ones to reliably use the perceptual 
appearances of objects to support their inductions. 
By age 4, children use category membership to support inductions, even 
in the stringent test case where perceptual appearance and category label 
lead to different conclusions. Moreover, children have begun to differentiate 
between the kinds of properties that are justified to project to other category 
members and those that are not. Despite all these accomplishments, however, 
there is much left for children to learn about the relationship between cate- 
gories and induction. 
The first issue is how children constrain which kinds of categories support 
inductions. Some categories, such as artifacts (e.g., chairs, coats), do not pick 
out objects in nature that have indefinitely many properties in common. We 
assume that adults do not expect artifacts such as forks or saws to have as 
rich an internal structure as natural kinds. The present studies examined only 
natural kinds, and so do not tell us whether natural kinds have a special status 
for children. More recent work (Gelman, 1984) suggests that preschoolers do 
not yet consistently distinguish between natural kinds and artifacts in the 
inferences they draw. 
A related issue is that children must sort out which properties are likely 
to be common to members of different types of categories. Although they 
have begun to work out this problem by age 4, their distinctions on even a 
crude level are imperfect. Even with properties that are determined by per- 
ceptual features (e.g., the weight of an object), some children based their 
inductions on the category. For example, there were children who claimed 
that a large fish weighs the same amount as a little fish, because both are 
fish. Furthermore, this problem quickly becomes more complicated. Adults’ 
inductive inferences are constrained in ways that no one has yet been able to 
characterize (Goodman, 1955); we lack good theories to explain which infer- 
ences are warranted. A predicate may or may not promote inductions, de- 
pending on the level of abstraction of a category (all dogs bark, but not all 
animals bark) or the scientific domain (density at room temperature is impor- 
tant for metals but not animals). There are other principles as well that adults 
are known to rely on. Nisbett and his colleagues (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & 
Kunda, 1983) have shown that adults are quite willing to infer new informa- 
tion from one member of a category to other category members, but they do 
so selectively, depending on the property involved. Adults rely on their con- 
ceptions of how variable the property is within the domain being questioned 
to make their inferences. So, their inferences within a category are largely 
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governed by their theories about the properties involved. Our studies have 
not tested the limits of children’s abilities, but even so it is clear that children 
must develop more finely tuned distinctions among predicates and learn not 
to overgeneralize to inappropriate predicates. 
Another way in which children are likely to be limited is that they may not 
be able to look much beyond perceptual features of objects when they form 
categories on their own. In the present studies, children were told the cate- 
gory labels and then asked to infer information from one member to another. 
This task is simpler than the converse problem of having to form the category 
in the first place without knowing beforehand which properties are relevant. 
When initially forming a category, children are likely to be much more influ- 
enced by perceptual appearances. Most standard classification procedures 
(e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1964) require children to divide objects into cate- 
gories where many bases of classification are possible. Given the complexity 
of this problem (cf. Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983; Markman & Callanan, 
1983), children often find the superficial perceptual appearances of objects 
to be an easier way of organizing the material. 
As for natural kinds, Keil (in press) found young children to be more 
dependent on perceptual similarity than on deeper biological properties when 
they are asked to classify anomalous objects. This is again what one would 
expect, given the limited biological knowledge of young children. Children 
were asked to classify artifacts and natural kind objects, given conflicting 
information. For example, one object looked exactly like a skunk but its 
biological functions (e.g., heart, bones) and lineage (parents) were supposed 
to be that of a raccoon. The youngest children believed for both natural kinds 
and artifacts that appearance determined category membership. For example, 
they would say that the animal that looked like a skunk was in fact a skunk, 
even though they had been told it had a raccoon heart, gave birth to raccoon 
babies, and so forth. Not until about second grade were children willing to 
say that internal structure was an important criterion for categorizing natural 
kind objects. But younger children probably have no way of knowing whether 
internal structure or external structure is more important. Another way of 
stating the difference between Keil’s task and ours, is that children were 
asked to make different sorts of comparisons in the two sets of studies. On 
Keil’s task, children had to compare two different kinds of attributes - 
perceptual appearance versus biological properties - and determine which 
is more important for defining the category. On our task, children had to 
compare the relative importance of category membership versus perceptual 
similarity. Recent work by Gelman, Collman, and Maccoby (1986) demon- 
strates that these two tasks are reliably different for young children. 
Finally, as Carey (1985) has argued, children must learn how natural kind 
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categories are related to one another in a system of theory-based knowledge. 
Carey has found that children initially organize biological knowledge around 
humans as a prototype. Inferences about the biological properties of other 
species are based both on what children believe about people and on how 
similar the species is to humans. For example, children were taught that 
people (or some other animal) had an omentum and were asked whether 
various animals and artifacts had an omentum. Children drew inferences 
about biological categories primarily when the property was known to be true 
of people. Children were more likely to infer that a biological property of 
people would generalize to bugs than they were to infer that a property of 
bees would generalize to bugs, despite the far greater similarity of bugs to 
bees. This marked dependence on humans as the prototype changes with age: 
adults generalize from one species to another based on how similar the species 
are to each other (Rips, 1975). 
Beyond age 4 then, children have much to learn about the relationship 
between categories and induction. Yet at an age when children are known to 
find perceptual appearances compelling and when their underlying theories 
are impoverished at best, they nevertheless expect rich similarities among 
natural kind objects with the same name. Perhaps 4-year-olds have gathered 
enough information for them to have reached this conclusion about the struc- 
ture of categories on an empirical basis. It is also possible that children are 
initially biased to interpret category terms this way, independent of experi- 
ence. Other expectations about the structure of natural language categories 
appear quite early. When children as young as 18-24 months hear an object 
labeled with a common noun, they assume the term refers to the object as a 
whole rather than to one of its properties (Macnamara, 1982). By 3 or 4 years 
of age and possibly earlier, children expect a noun to refer to objects that 
are taxonomically related (e.g., a dog and a cat) even though in the absence 
of a label they are likely to group objects on the basis of thematic relations 
(e.g., a dog and a bone) (Markman & Hutchinson, 1984). The assumption 
that categories promote rich inductive inferences could be another early bias, 
one that helps children acquire category terms rapidly, organize knowledge 
efficiently, and induce information to novel exemplars of familiar categories. 
By expecting unforeseen nonperceptual properties to be common to members 
of a kind, children could go beyond the original basis for grouping objects 
into a category and discover more about the category members than they 
knew before. Children might start out assuming that categories will have the 
structure of natural kinds. With development children would then refine these 
expectations, limiting them to properties, domains, and category types that 
are appropriate. 
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Une des fonctions principales des termes d’espbces naturelles (comme, par exemple, figre et or) est de per- 
mettre de formuler des inferences inductives. On s’attend a ce que les membres de telles categories partagent 
des proprittes importantes et imprevues, comme par exemple le type des organes internes et la structure 
gtnttique. De plus, il est possible d’effectuer des inferences inductives alors que l’information perceptuelle 
est fragmentaire, par exemple lorsqu’un objet ne ressemble pas beaucoup a d’autres membres de sa categoric, 
ou lorsqu’une propriett est inobservable. Dans ce travail, la question qui nous interesse est de determiner 
l’origine de cette attitude vis-a-vis des esptces naturelles. Les jeunes enfants, qui s’appuient habituellement 
pour leurs inferences sur les apparences perceptives et n’ont qu’un savoir scientifique rudimentaire, pourraient 
bien ne pas gentraliser de nouvelles informations par induction dans le cas des especes naturelles. Pour tester 
cette possibilitt, nous avons oppose appartenance categorielle et similitude perceptuelle dans une tlche d’in- 
duction. Par exemple, des enfants devaient decider si un requin respire comme un Poisson d’aquarium (tous 
les deux sont des poissons) ou comme un dauphin (apparence semblable). A partir de 4 ans au plus tard, les 
enfants peuvent utiliser les categories pour fonder une inference inductive m&me lorsque l’appartenance 
cattgorielle est en conflit avec les apparences. En plus, ces jeunes enfants ont partiellement effectut une 
separation entre les proprietes qui autorisent I’induction dans une m&me categoric (par exemple la respiration) 
et les proprietes qui dependent en fait des apparences perceptuelles (comme le poids). Puisque nous n’avons 
ttudit que le cas des categories d’esptces naturelles, nous ne savons pas jusqu’a quel point les enfants 
differencient les especes naturelles des autres types de categories. L’hypothese de depart des enfants pourrait 
etre que toutes les categories linguistiquement nommtes ont la structure des especes naturelles, et ces attentes 
pourraient se modifier au tours du dtveloppement. 
